Executive Summary
• Spending on benefits and tax credits is similar per person in Scotland to the average across the UK, although the distribution of this spending is somewhat different. More is spent in Scotland on disability-related benefits, while less is spent on housing benefit.
• For some large areas of public service spending ---notably health and education ---spending per person is also similar in Scotland to the UK average. However, in other areas ---such as enterprise and economic development, and housing ---the Scottish government spends considerably more per person than is spent across the UK as a whole.
• The Scottish government chooses to spend relatively more on investment, rather than current, spending than the UK government does as a whole. In part, this reflects the fact that the service areas that receive relatively greater funding in Scotland are relatively capital intensive. But also a greater fraction of the budget in most service areas is spent on capital (i.e. investment items) rather than current (i.e. day-to-day) spending. 1 The authors thank Stuart Adam, Rowena Crawford, Carl Emmerson and Paul Johnson for comments, help and advice. They also gratefully acknowledge funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through the Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy at IFS (grant reference ES/H021221/1). The ESRC is supporting a programme of work addressing issues around the future of Scotland. One of the strands focuses on supporting new work at current major ESRC investments before and potentially after the referendum.
Taxation in Scotland
• Onshore revenues in Scotland totalled £47.6 billion in 2012---13, or £8,952 per person. This was slightly lower than the £9,109 per person raised across the UK as a whole. This gap is similar to the gap in 2011---12.
• More is raised per person in Scotland than across the UK as a whole from indirect taxes ---in particular, duties on gambling, alcohol and tobacco. Less is raised per person in Scotland from income tax, council tax and stamp duties.
• Offshore oil and gas production contributed £6.6 billion to the UK exchequer in 2012---13, lower than the £11.3 billion raised in 2011---12.
• If these offshore revenues are allocated between Scotland and the rest of the UK on a geographic basis, Scotland is estimated to have received £5.6 billion in 2012---13, or £1,050 per person.
Scotland's public finances: the medium-term outlook
• Scotland's offshore revenue in 2012---13 was not quite sufficient to outweigh the higher level of public spending per person in Scotland in that year. As a result, Scotland is estimated to have been in a weaker fiscal position than the UK as a whole in that year: Scotland's net fiscal deficit is estimated to have been 8.3% of GDP, compared with 7.3% for the UK. This is in contrast to 2011---12, when Scotland's net fiscal deficit was smaller than the UK's.
• The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) forecasts that revenues from offshore oil and gas production will decline further over the next few years. If this turns out to be the case, Scotland's fiscal position would not strengthen as quickly as the UK's.
• Using the OBR's forecasts for the UK as a whole and assuming a population share of debt is allocated to an independent Scotland, we estimate that Scotland's net fiscal deficit would decline from 8.3% of GDP in 2012---13 to 2.9% by 2018---19, assuming that the government of a newly independent Scotland continued to implement the spending cuts pencilled in by George Osborne for 2016---17, 2017---18 and 2018---19 . However, by the same date, the UK as a whole is projected to achieve a net fiscal surplus of 0.2% of GDP.
• The medium-term outlook for an independent Scotland is sensitive to a number of factors ---not least the revenues that might be received from offshore oil and gas production and the quantity of existing UK debt that an independent Scotland would be required to service. If offshore revenues were to come in more in line with some of the scenarios outlined recently by 2
Introduction
The potential consequences of independence for taxation, public services and the welfare system in Scotland are a key battleground in the ongoing campaigning ahead of the independence referendum this September. In order to shed light on these issues, over the course of 2012 and 2013, IFS published a series of papers analysing particular areas: Fiscal sustainability of an independent Scotland, M. Amior, R. Crawford and G. Tetlow (November 2013) .
This briefing note provides a summary of the key findings of these papers, including the medium-term outlook for Scotland's public finances. 2 In doing so, it also updates the figures to take into account the latest data on taxation and spending contained in the Scottish government's latest Government Expenditure
• While in the recent past revenues from the North Sea have usually been enough to close the gap between spending and onshore revenues, this was not the case in 2012-13. And if oil revenues further decline as forecast by the OBR, this will also not be the case in the coming years.
• Taken together, the OBR's forecasts imply that, in the medium term, an independent Scotland's public finances would be in a substantially weaker position than those of the UK, unless it were to undertake further spending cuts or tax rises on top of those already pencilled in for the coming years.
• Even if oil revenues do rebound in the medium term, this does not necessarily mean that tax rises or spending cuts can be avoided forever. An independent Scotland would perhaps want to use any bounceback in oil revenues to reduce debt levels and prepare for the longer-term challenges of population ageing and the inevitable eventual decline of North Sea revenues.
These findings provide the fiscal context to the current Scottish government's priorities for tax and spending in an independent Scotland as set out in its White Paper. 5 These are discussed in a companion briefing note. 6 The rest of this briefing note proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyses spending on public services and benefits in Scotland, highlighting those areas of spending that explain the overall higher government expenditure in Scotland, while Section 3 looks at how much tax is raised in Scotland and from which taxes. Section 4 puts the spending and taxation sides together to look at the health of Scotland's public finances, both in the most recent year of data (2012-13) and over the medium term to 2016-17 (potentially the first year of an independent Scotland) and 2018-19. Section 5 concludes.
Because our earlier findings still largely stand, readers wanting more information on a particular topic (e.g. how the pattern of welfare spending has changed over time; or detailed information on how Scotland may want to redesign its tax system) may wish to consult our earlier (more comprehensive) papers, listed above. Where our earlier work seems particularly relevant, we provide references to specific pages in these papers. Appendix 1 to this briefing note also provides a reconciliation with our earlier work based on the 2011-12 version of GERS. 7
Public spending in Scotland
Under current constitutional arrangements, whilst a large part of public expenditure in Scotland is undertaken by the Scottish government and Scottish local government, certain areas -including defence, foreign affairs, and benefits and tax credits -are 'reserved matters' and are the responsibility of the UK government. Thus, to obtain a full understanding of public spending undertaken for the benefit of the people of Scotland, one has to include not only spending undertaken by the Scottish government and local government, but also estimate spending by the UK government for the benefit of people living in Scotland.
Doing this, the Scottish government's GERS publication estimates that total managed expenditure (TME) for the benefit of Scotland was £65.2 billion in 2012-13, the latest year for which data are available. This was approximately 9.3% of the UK-wide figure for TME of £701.7 billion, higher than Scotland's 8.3% share of the UK population. This means that estimated TME per person in Scotland (£12,271) was 11.4% higher than the figure for the UK as a whole (£11,015). This relatively higher spending in Scotland is a long-term phenomenon 8 and the gap was fairly stable at between 10% and 12% in the five years from 2008-09 to 2012-13. 9 This makes Scotland (along with London) stand out as having relatively high average household income and relatively high government spending. 10 Another way to consider the relative levels of TME in Scotland and the UK as a whole is to measure TME as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP): this provides information on the size of the state relative to the economy. In the case of Scotland, a difficulty arises in how output generated from offshore oil and gas production should be allocated between Scotland and the rest of the UK. GERS uses two methods to apportion North Sea output and revenues: a population share (i.e. Scotland is allocated a fraction of North Sea output and revenues equal to its share of the UK population) and a geographic share (i.e. using estimates of the share of North Sea output that would be in Scottish waters if the median-line principle were used to divide up the North Sea on a geographical basis). 11 Figure 1 shows that the method used makes a substantial difference to Scotland's estimated GDP and thus to the relative magnitude of government spending in Scotland versus the UK as a whole. Assigning a population-based share of North Sea output to Scotland, equal to £2.0 billion in 2012-13, gives an estimate of GDP 
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per capita in Scotland of £24,141, slightly lower than the £24,700 for the UK as a whole. Combined with higher levels of spending per person, on this basis, TME is a higher share of GDP in Scotland than for the UK as a whole: 50.8% compared with 44.6% in 2012-13. Allocating a geographical share of North Sea output to Scotland, equal to £18.4 billion in 2012-13, increases Scottish GDP per capita to £27,227. On this basis, TME was estimated to be 45.1% of Scottish GDP in 2012-13. This is much closer to the figure for the UK as a whole, but is still slightly higher. In contrast, between 2008-09 and 2011-12, TME was a lower share of GDP in Scotland than in the UK as a whole when allocating North Sea output on a geographic basis. 12 What happens in the future depends upon how much output is generated in the North Sea, the performance of Scotland's onshore economy compared with that of the UK as a whole, and the level of TME in Scotland compared with the rest of the UK. We return to the first and last of these issues later in this briefing note. In the remainder of this briefing note, we focus on figures for revenues and output that allocate Scotland a geographic share of oil and gas production and revenues. Detailed discussion of the main differences between using these geographic allocations and population-based allocations is provided in our earlier papers.
12 See figure 2 of Deaner and Phillips (2013) Breaking TME down into its components TME can be broken down into a number of different components based on the purpose of the spending. This is done for both Scotland and the UK as a whole in Table 1 . Source: TME in Scotland and the whole UK taken from GERS 2012---13. Benefit spending is taken from DWP, HMRC and DSDNI benefit statistics. Public service spending is calculated as a residual (i.e. TME ---Benefits ---Debt interest ---Accounting adjustment).
The largest item is spending on public services. This type of spending includes both the amount spent on the day-to-day running and administration of services such as health, education and transport, and investment in facilities such as new hospitals, schools and roads. Spending on public services amounted to £40.7 billion in 2012-13 in Scotland, or £7,663 per person. This was £1,205 or 18.6% higher than the amount spent per person across the UK as a whole in the same year. Spending per person on benefits and tax credits was just 1.8% higher in Scotland than across the UK as a whole, while (by definition) per-capita spending on debt interest is assumed to be the same. It is important to note, however, that this latter assumption does not mean that an independent Scotland would be required to spend the same amount per person on debt interest. This 8 would depend on the level of debt inherited by an independent Scotland and the rate of interest it faced on that debt.
It is therefore clear that it is higher spending on public services per person that drives most of the difference in overall TME per person; spending per person on benefits and tax credits in Scotland is much closer to the average for the UK as a whole.
Public service spending in Scotland
Whilst more is spent on public services per person in Scotland than in the UK as a whole, this higher spending is not spread evenly across different public services. To illustrate this, Table 2 shows spending per person by service area in Scotland and the UK.
The level of spending per person in Scotland on many of the largest items is fairly similar to that across the UK as a whole. For instance, spending on health is 8.9% higher per person and that on education and training is 4.9% higher per persondifferences considerably smaller than the overall gap of 18.6%. 13 It is on the smaller items of spending, which are largely the responsibility of the Scottish government, that spending per person in Scotland is proportionally greatest. For instance, spending on enterprise and economic development per person in Scotland was well over twice as high as the UK-wide average. 14 However, there are also two areas where less is spent per person in Scotland: science and technology, and public order and safety.
Together, this means the pattern of spending on public services in Scotland is substantially different from that for the UK as a whole. For instance, for the UK as a whole, spending on education and training, health, public order and safety, defence and international services together make up 70.4% of all spending on public services. In contrast, for Scotland, the equivalent figure is 62.1%. This reflects the fact that whilst spending per person on public services for the benefit 13 One large spending area where Scotland does spend significantly more per person than the UK as a whole does is personal social services. This reflects, in part, the more generous policy of free personal care for the elderly that operates in Scotland. For further discussion, see pages 37---40 of Deaner and Phillips (2013).
14 Our earlier report (Deaner and Phillips, 2013) , based on GERS 2011---12, showed spending on this category to be more than three times as high per person as for the UK as a whole. Data revisions in GERS 2012---13 have increased the estimated spend in the rest of the UK, however, reducing the gap somewhat. a Calculated as a residual by subtracting benefit spending (including council tax benefit) as recorded in DWP benefit statistics from GERS social protection expenditure figures. b Total is for service spending only so does not include debt interest, accounting adjustments or benefits expenditure.
Source: GERS 2012---13; DWP benefits statistics (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-security-expenditure-in-the-united-kingdom-includingscotland); DSDNI resource accounts; HMRC resource accounts; authors' calculations.
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of Scotland was 18.6% higher than the UK average, for these five service areas the difference was only 4.9%. This means spending per person on the remaining areas was 51.4% (£994) higher than the average for the UK as a whole in 2012-13.
This pattern of slightly higher-than-average spending per person on health and education, and substantially higher spending on most other devolved services, is similar to the situation in Wales and Northern Ireland. 15 Furthermore, these differences in spending patterns have become much more pronounced over time.
Spending on health and education per person increased by less in Scotland during the 2000s than in the UK as a whole, while spending on other areas such as transport and social services grew more rapidly (and has subsequently been cut by less). 16 This suggests that the Scottish government has been able to use its discretion over how to spend its block grant allocation to prioritise service areas differently from the UK government's decisions for England.
Table 2 also shows that Scotland has a different mix of capital spending (i.e. spending on building new schools, hospitals, roads, buying new equipment etc.) and current spending (i.e. spending on day-to-day administration and operation of services) from the UK as a whole. Capital spending per person is around 50% higher than the average for the UK as a whole, whereas current spending per person is 15% higher. This means that whereas capital spending made up 11.1% of all public service spending for the UK as a whole in 2012-13, it made up 14.0% of spending in Scotland. Capital spending per person has been consistently higher in Scotland than in the UK as a whole since at least 2002-03, although the difference has grown substantially since 2009-10 as capital spending has been cut by less in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. 17
The higher share of capital spending in Scotland reflects two things. First, those services on which relatively more is spent in Scotland -such as housing and community amenities, transport, and enterprise and economic developmentare more capital-intensive. Second, as shown in Figure 2 , in most instances a relatively larger share of spending is devoted to capital spending in Scotland even conditional upon service area. The most notable exception to this general pattern is transport. This reflects high current spending on transport in Scotland in the form of subsidies to the railways and to ferry and air services in the Highlands and Islands. 18 Source: GERS 2012---13; PESA 2013; DWP benefit statistics; DSDNI resource accounts; HMRC resource accounts; authors' calculations.
Benefit and tax credit spending in Scotland
Adding the tax credit expenditure that GERS counts as negative taxation (rather than spending) gives a figure of total benefit spending in Scotland of £18.1 billion, or £3,407 per person. This is 1.6% higher than the average for the UK.
While total benefit spending per person in Scotland is little different from that in the UK as a whole, the pattern of spending by benefit differs, as shown in Table 3 . In particular, spending on disability benefits per person in the population was 19% higher in Scotland (£645) than in the UK as a whole (£540). Spending per person was also a little higher on old-age benefits such as the state pension. On the other hand, spending per person on housing benefit and on child benefits and tax credits was lower than the average for the UK. These patterns are very similar to those in 2011-12 and other recent years. Note: 'Old-age benefits' are the state pension, pension credit, concessionary TV licences and winter fuel payments. 'Disability benefits' are attendance allowance, carer's allowance, disability living allowance, employment and support allowance, incapacity benefit, industrial injuries benefit and severe disablement allowance. 'Tax credits and child benefits' are the child and working tax credits, child benefit, maternity allowance and statutory maternity pay. 'Housing benefits' are housing benefit. 'Other means-tested benefits' are income support, jobseeker's allowance and council tax benefit. 'Other benefits' are the remaining benefits, including the small number not broken down by nation (allocated in the same proportion to those benefits for which expenditures are broken down by nation). Employment and support allowance is counted as non-means-tested, and jobseeker's allowance as means-tested, whereas in practice both contain means-tested and non-means-tested elements. Source: Authors' calculations based on DWP published analysis available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-security-expenditure-in-the-united-kingdomincluding-scotland.
Our earlier work looked in detail at the factors underlying this different pattern of benefit expenditure. 19 It found that, in part, the differences reflect the different age profile of Scotland: a slightly larger fraction of the population are of pensionable age and a smaller fraction are children than in the UK as a whole. Spending on child benefits and tax credits per child and spending on old-age benefits per person aged 60 or over are very close to the average for the UK.
However, differences in the age structure of the population cannot explain the greater amounts spent on disability benefits: the proportion of the population claiming, and thus the average amount spent, are higher in Scotland at all working-age ages than in the UK as a whole.
Spending on housing benefit is lower in Scotland largely because rents are lower. This reflects both lower private and social sector rents, and a larger fraction of people on housing benefit living in social housing (where rents are lower than in the private sector). However, significant spending by the Scottish government on social housing and other housing initiatives means total spending on housing in 2011-12 was higher in Scotland (£597 per person) than in England (£493) or Wales (£471) -and the same is likely to be true of 2012-13 (given the substantial investment in housing described in the previous subsection). There are clearly questions about whether support for housing is best delivered via greater direct investment in social housing and low social rents or via rent subsidies for those with low incomes (i.e. housing benefit). But it is worth noting that under the present devolution settlement, the Scottish government is bearing the cost of greater investment in social housing and lower rents, whilst some of the benefits of that spending accrue to the UK government in the form of lower housing benefit payments.
Benefit spending per person has grown less quickly in Scotland in recent years than in the rest of the country. In 2000-01 benefit spending per person in Scotland was just over 109% of the amount spent per person across the UK as a whole. By 2005-06 this had fallen to 107% and by 2012-13 it was a little under 102% of the UK level.
What explains the slower growth in benefit spending in Scotland? Our earlier analysis 20 shows that the relatively slower growth in benefit spending in Scotland can be explained partly by stronger growth in employment (at least until 2007) and earnings, a relative fall in the proportion of people entitled to disability benefits, a fall in the number of children relative to the rest of the UK, and slower growth in the proportion of households in receipt of housing benefit.
What happens in the future will depend on future demographic and economic trends in Scotland vis-à-vis the rest of the UK and on policy decisions (whether by the UK government or the Scottish government The second column of Table 4 shows DWP's estimates of how the spending gap would change given the current Scottish government's stated intentions for benefits policy in an independent Scotland. In particular, it includes the impact of:
• undoing recent changes to housing benefit that reduce payments to tenants of social landlords who are deemed to be under-occupying their homes (the 'bedroom tax');
• halting the roll-out of universal credit and the transfer of working-age claimants of disability living allowance to personal independence payments (which have tougher eligibility criteria, expected to reduce the number of claimants by around 20%);
• retaining the savings credit element of pension credit, and setting the new flat-rate state pension at a slightly higher level than planned by the UK government.
It also includes the impact of delaying the date at which the state pension age starts increasing from 66 to 67, from 2026 to 2034. This is not Scottish government policy. However, the Scottish government has stated it will assess the case for delaying the increase in the state pension age planned for 2026. 23 One option would be to put this increase back to when it was initially planned (2034) before being brought forward by the current UK government.
Unsurprisingly, these increases in generosity would cost money. For instance, in 2018-19, rather than being 0.8% lower per working-age person, benefit spending in Scotland would be 1.4% higher under Scottish government plans. This gap would increase to 7.6% in 2028-29, when the state pension age is assumed to be 66 in Scotland but 67 elsewhere in the UK, before falling back to 4.5% by the late 2050s.
As well as increasing generosity and/or undoing unpopular elements of recent benefits policy, independence would give Scotland the opportunity for more radical reform. However, major reforms to the benefit system would likely either create large numbers of losers or else involve a substantial increase in overall benefit spending. This does not mean such reforms should not be considered but it is important to bear in mind that there is often difficulty in translating worthy aims into feasible and affordable policies. 24
Taxation in Scotland
This section describes the current level and composition of tax revenues in Scotland and examines how and why they differ from those in the UK as a whole. Because most taxes are collected at the UK level -the major exceptions are council tax and non-domestic rates -it is not straightforward to identify the precise amounts obtained from Scotland's residents or enterprises. The Scottish government's GERS publication provides estimates of the revenues raised in Scotland, and it is those estimates we use here. These are not the only estimates available: last year, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) for the first time produced its own estimates allocating revenue from HMRC taxes (but not other taxes) 23 Recent announcements have hinted strongly that the Scottish government would delay the increase in the pension age, and have argued that such a policy would be fairer due to lower life expectancy in Scotland and that such a policy would be more affordable in an independent Scotland (http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Life-expectancy-and-state-pensions-c6b.aspx). This issue is discussed in more detail in Phillips and Tetlow (2014) . Since North Sea oil and gas is a potentially important source of revenue for an independent Scotland, but there is substantial uncertainty about just how much revenue will be raised from this source, we first analyse onshore revenue in isolation and then look at the effect of adding in offshore revenue.
Onshore revenue
In 2012-13, onshore revenue in Scotland was £47.6 billion, equivalent to £8,952 per person or 37.7% of Scotland's onshore GDP. In the UK as a whole, onshore revenue was £580.3 billion, equivalent to £9,109 per person or 37.0% of the UK's onshore GDP. 28 This means that onshore revenues per person in Scotland were 98.3% of the figure for the UK as a whole and that -with 8.3% of the UK population -Scotland contributed 8.2% of UK onshore revenues. Table 5 shows the composition of onshore revenue in 2012-13 in Scotland and the UK. On the whole, the composition of revenue in Scotland does not differ greatly from that in the UK as a whole. In both cases, the three big taxes -income tax, National Insurance contributions (NICs) and VAT -account for more than a Net of the part of tax credits classified as negative income tax in the National Accounts. Most of the cost of tax credits is counted as government spending. b Includes some small taxes, TV licences, National Lottery funds, royalties, interest and dividends, rent, gross operating surplus and accounting adjustments.
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Source: Authors' calculations from tables 3.1 and 3.6 of GERS 2012---13.
18 three-fifths of revenue. But according to GERS, relative to the UK as a whole, somewhat more of Scotland's onshore revenue comes from: VAT; 'sin taxes' on alcohol, tobacco and gambling; smaller environmental taxes; and 'other revenue'. 29 Scotland generates somewhat less of its revenue from: income tax; stamp duty land tax (SDLT); and council tax.
In terms of revenue per person, the biggest difference comes from the biggest tax: in 2012-13, income tax provided £2,045 per person in Scotland, well below the UK figure of £2,319. This is particularly interesting because NICs, which are like income tax in many respects, yield similar amounts in Scotland and the rest of the UK. This is explained by two factors: 30 first, the combination of the progressive rate structure of income tax and the slightly more equal distribution of income in Scotland; and second, income tax being levied on investment income, which is lower in Scotland than in the rest of the UK, whereas NICs are only levied on earned income.
Where Scots pay more than the rest of the UK is in indirect taxes -in particular, duties on betting and gaming, alcohol and tobacco together rake in £419 per person in Scotland, compared with £329 across the UK as a whole. Higher levels of smoking, and higher consumption of spirits (which are taxed far more heavily per unit of alcohol than beer and wine), explain this pattern. 31
Adding in offshore revenue
North Sea oil and gas production contributed £6.6 billion to the UK exchequer in 2012-13. 32 How ownership of this resource would be divided in the event of Scottish independence would be a matter for legal argument and negotiation. 33 Here we present figures that assume revenues from oil and gas production would be allocated to Scotland on a geographic basis. GERS provides figures assuming both population-based and geographic allocations of revenues: the difference compared with £5.6 billion in 2012-13 and £10.0 billion in 2011-12. Looking ahead, the OBR's central forecast is for offshore tax receipts to continue to decline. However, the future path of offshore revenues is highly uncertain and the Scottish government is more optimistic. For this reason, in the next section, we explore how sensitive an independent Scotland's public finances would be to different scenarios for North Sea revenues.
Bringing onshore and offshore revenues together allows us to look at total revenues (Table 6 ). Total UK government revenue in 2012-13 was £586.9 billion 34 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hmrc-tax-and-nics-receipts-for-the-uk. 35 Using the GERS estimate that Scotland's geographic share of North Sea revenues in 2012---13 was 84.2%.
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(or £9,213 per person). Allocating offshore revenues on a geographical basis, GERS estimates that Scottish revenues were £53.1 billion (£10,002 per person). On this basis, total revenues in 2012-13 were £789 per person (8.6%) higher than in the UK as a whole. Most, but not all, of this higher revenue would disappear in the coming years if offshore revenues decline as the OBR expects.
Scotland's public finances: the medium-term outlook
So what do these revenue and spending estimates imply for Scotland's notional fiscal position? We examine two commonly-used measures of the fiscal position: the current budget balance and the net fiscal balance. The current budget balance refers to the gap between revenues and current expenditure (including depreciation). The net fiscal balance adds in net investment (i.e. capital expenditure minus depreciation) to obtain a more complete picture of how total spending compares with revenues (this is similar to what the UK government terms public sector net borrowing).
Scotland's public finances: a historical perspective
How did Scotland's public finances look in the years up to 2012-13? Figures 3  and 4 show the current budget balance and the net fiscal balance for Scotland and for the UK as a whole for the period 2008-09 to 2012-13. If oil and gas revenues are allocated on a geographic basis, Scotland's current budget deficit is estimated to have been 5.9% of GDP in 2012-13 and the net fiscal deficit to have been 8.3% of GDP. These compare with 5.8% and 7.3%, respectively, for the UK. That Scotland's current budget position was similar to the UK's but its net fiscal position was worse reflects the fact that, as set out in Section 2, Scotland has a higher level of capital spending than the UK does.
In the four years before that, revenues from oil and gas production were larger and so, on this basis, Scotland had a stronger fiscal position than the UK as a whole. The fall in revenues from oil and gas production in 2012-13 meant that Scotland's current budget position and net fiscal balance actually worsened between 2011-12 and 2012-13, rather than strengthening as was seen for the UK as a whole.
The health of Scotland's public finances (assuming a geographic share of oil and gas revenues) is strongly linked to the scale of revenues from oil and gas production. In good years -such as 2008-09 and 2011-12 -strong revenues mean Scotland's fiscal balance has been better than that of the UK as a whole. In less good years -such as 2012-13 and much of the 1990s and early 2000s -Scotland's position has been worse. How oil and gas revenues evolve over the coming years would therefore be central to an independent Scotland's public Scotland, including geographic share of oil and gas UK, 100% of oil and gas 22 finances if these revenues are split on a geographic basis, as seems likely to be the case. 36
Scotland's public finances: the prospects to 2018---19
In this subsection, we present updated forecasts for Scotland's net fiscal balance for the period up to 2018-19. 37 It is not only revenues from oil and gas that are uncertain over this horizon. How onshore revenues and public spending will change in Scotland and the UK as a whole is also uncertain and will depend on the strength of their economies and the policy decisions taken by government. If Scotland votes for independence, negotiations around issues such as how to split the national debt will also have to take place and it is not clear what rate of interest the Scottish government would have to pay on any debt it inherits or issues. Because of these uncertainties, we look at a number of different scenarios for Scotland's public finances by varying assumptions about:
• the level of revenues from oil and gas;
• the level of debt an independent Scotland would inherit;
• whether the government of an independent Scotland continues with the UK government's fiscal consolidation plans beyond April 2016.
In our scenarios, we assume the UK's public finances evolve in line with the latest OBR forecasts from the March 2014 Economic and Fiscal Outlook. These show the UK's net fiscal deficit steadily shrinking over the forecast period as the economy recovers and further fiscal consolidation (largely consisting of public spending cuts) is implemented. The OBR forecasts suggest that in 2018-19 the UK will be running a small net fiscal surplus for the first time since 2001-02.
We produce our forecasts for Scotland using bottom-up projections of different components of revenue and spending. These projections take as their starting point Scotland's share of these revenues and spending in 2012-13 (according to 36 Of course, if an independent Scotland were to receive a less-than-geographical share of North Sea revenues, its fiscal position would be even worse: a smaller share of a volatile revenue stream does mean less volatility, but it also means less revenue too. 37 This updates the analysis that was presented in M. Amior, R. Crawford and G. Tetlow, Fiscal Sustainability of an Independent Scotland, Report R88, 2013, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6952 and R. Crawford and G. Tetlow (2014) , The next five years look better but tough fiscal choices remain for Scotland, IFS Observation. A comparison of our latest projections for the Scottish net fiscal balance (presented here) with those that we and other organisations have previously produced is provided in Appendix 3.
GERS)
, and then project forward using forecast UK-wide changes, accounting for the different demographic trends in Scotland and the UK as a whole. 38 In our baseline projections for Scotland, we assume that Scotland would inherit a population-based share of the UK's national debt and that North Sea revenues move in line with OBR forecasts. Figure 5 shows that under the baseline scenario, Scotland's net fiscal deficit would be around 5.5% of GDP in its first year of independence . If the government of an independent Scotland continued to implement the fiscal consolidation that is being planned by the UK government, the net fiscal deficit would shrink to 2.9% of GDP in 2018-19. However, this is around 3% of GDP larger than the UK's deficit in 2018-19 (the OBR forecasts a surplus of 0.2% for the UK as a whole). 39
However, Figure 5 also demonstrates how sensitive Scotland's medium-term fiscal position will be to revenues from oil and gas. If revenues from oil and gas were instead to evolve according to one of the more optimistic scenarios contained in the Scottish government's recent 'Oil and gas analytical bulletin', 40 Scotland's fiscal balance would be significantly better -a deficit of 0.9% of GDP by 2018-19 -although still weaker than the UK's position in that year (which would show a surplus of 0.4% of GDP under this scenario). The main factor that has led to a worsening of Scotland's position relative to that of the UK is the downward revision to forecast revenues from oil and gas that the OBR made in December 2013, coupled with the lower share of these revenues that GERS now suggests will accrue to Scotland on a geographic basis. Scotland's primary deficit -i.e. the gap between tax revenues and public spending excluding debt interest repayments -is forecast to be 2.8% of GDP in its first year of independence (2016-17) under our baseline scenario. Thus it would have to borrow to cover day-to-day spending even ignoring the amount needing to be spent on debt interest payments. Therefore, what interest rate lenders charge to the government of an independent Scotland will be a pertinent question, regardless of what share of the UK's existing debt Scotland is required to service. However, the interest rate will be much more important if Scotland also inherits a significant share of existing debt. would act to reduce the size of an independent Scotland's net fiscal deficit by reducing the amount to be spent on debt interest payments.
Under our baseline scenario, with a population-based share of debt and assuming that Scotland would be charged the same average rate of interest as the UK, we estimate that Scotland would have to devote 2.7% of GDP to debt interest payments in 2016-17, rising to 3.0% by 2018-19. Negotiating a settlement with the UK government that involved no transfer of debt to Scotland would therefore strengthen Scotland's fiscal position considerably. As Figure 6 shows, under this scenario, Scotland would have a similar net fiscal position in 2018-19 to that of the UK as a whole. If Scotland were instead to inherit debt worth around 55% of Scottish GDP, Scotland's fiscal position would be slightly stronger than in our baseline scenario -with a net fiscal deficit of 2.1% of GDP in 2018-19 rather than 2.9%.
Ultimately, how much debt an independent Scotland would inherit is a matter for negotiation. Previous break-ups of states include examples where debt has been allocated in proportion to population (such as the former Czechoslovakia 42 ), where the main successor state eventually takes on all debts (as the UK did when 42 Debts were split on a two-thirds/one-third basis between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
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spending would be larger than is assumed in Figures 5 and 6 , and hence its fiscal deficit would also be larger.
All the figures presented so far assume that the government of an independent Scotland would continue to implement the fiscal tightening currently planned by the UK government for the years after potential independence. Figure 7 illustrates how Scotland's net fiscal balance might evolve if instead the Scottish government chose not to implement the fiscal tightening planned for 2017-18 and 2018-19 . If this were to happen, Scotland's net fiscal deficit would remain at nearly 6% of GDP from 2016-17 until 2018-19, rather than experiencing a further fiscal strengthening. This is nearly 3% of GDP higher than in our baseline scenario in 2018-19 and is a level of borrowing that would not be sustainable for any prolonged period. Thus, while independence would certainly bring more choice about how to deliver the planned fiscal consolidation -for instance, the mix of tax rises and spending cuts, or the timescale over which to deliver it -it would not mean that further fiscal consolidation could be avoided unless North Sea revenues were to rebound very strongly. Indeed, in our baseline scenario, the spending cuts or tax rises that would ultimately need to be made to ensure fiscal sustainability would be greater for an independent Scotland than for the UK as a whole. 
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Ensuring longer-run fiscal sustainability
Our previous work, which projected the fiscal position for an independent Scotland over the next 50 years, showed that Scotland will face significant fiscal challenges in future -requiring further tax increases and/or spending cuts after independence to ensure that debt will be on a sustainable path over the longer run. 46 While the UK as a whole also faces a similar challenge, our analysis suggests that the challenge facing an independent Scotland would be larger. We found this to be true under a range of assumptions about future revenues from oil and gas production, productivity growth, migration, the amount of debt inherited from the UK, and the interest rate charged by lenders to an independent Scottish government. The exact scale of the challenge is, however, obviously very sensitive to these assumptions: under the range of scenarios that we examined, we estimated that a fiscal tightening of between 1.9% and 6.3% of GDP would be required by an independent Scotland to ensure that debt did not exceed 40% of GDP by 2062-63.
Our earlier work was based on forecasts for the UK's public finances made by the OBR in March 2013. Since then, the OBR has revised its forecasts and now projects that the UK's public finances will be stronger at the end of the mediumterm horizon than was previously suggested. Specifically, the OBR now forecasts that structural borrowing will be -0.3 % of GDP (i.e. a surplus) at the end of the medium-term forecast horizon, rather than the 0.7% of GDP forecast in March 2013. This stronger position is largely the result of the additional spending cuts that George Osborne has pencilled in for 2018-19.
Assuming the government of an independent Scotland continued to implement the spending cuts planned by the current UK government up to 2018-19, these new figures for the UK also suggest that Scotland's medium-term fiscal position would be stronger than we assumed in our earlier work -by around 1% of GDP. However, this does not fundamentally change our conclusion that any government of a newly independent Scotland in 2016-17 is likely to need to find net tax rises and/or net spending cuts in order to ensure fiscal sustainability for Scotland. First, the stronger medium-term position assumes that the government of an independent Scotland would continue to implement the spending cuts pencilled in by George Osborne for 2017-18 and 2018-19 strengthening in Scotland's estimated fiscal position that has occurred since we published our previous report is still smaller than the size of fiscal consolidation we estimated would be required.
Our projections suggest that George Osborne's planned spending cuts in 2017-18 and 2018-19 would require a 6.8% cut to public service spending in real terms, if no further cuts were made to welfare spending. 47 Exactly how large the tax increases and/or spending cuts required by an independent Scottish government would need to be (and how quickly they would need to be implemented) would, however, depend on a number of factors. These include those highlighted earlier in this section and whatever the preferences of a newly independent Scottish government were for the level of public borrowing and debt.
It is against this fiscal backdrop that the policy proposals for an independent Scotland should be considered. The proposals contained in the Scottish government's White Paper are discussed in more detail in a companion Briefing Note. 48
Conclusions
Under present devolution arrangements, the responsibility for public spending in Scotland is split between the UK government -which is responsible for benefit spending, defence and foreign affairs, for instance -and the Scottish government, which is responsible for most other public services such as health and education. Public spending per person has long been higher in Scotland than in the UK as a whole, with the difference being around 11% (£1,257) in 2012-13. Within this, benefit spending is only 2% higher, but spending on public services is 19% higher, reflecting the relatively generous funding the Scottish government currently receives under the Barnett formula.
Taxation is largely the responsibility of the UK government -although the Scotland Act 2012 does devolve more powers and revenues to Scotland. In contrast to spending, onshore tax revenues have generally been slightly lower per person -2% lower in 2012-13, for instance. Between 2008-09 and 2011-12, offshore revenues -taxes on oil and gas -more than made up for this gap. But falling production, and increases in tax-deductible investment and operating 47 'Public service spending' is defined here as non-debt-interest spending less spending on benefits and public service pensions.
48 Phillips and Tetlow, 2014. 31 costs, mean that these revenues fell substantially in 2012-13 and were no longer sufficient to fill the gap between onshore taxes and spending fully. Scotland therefore went from having a smaller budget deficit than the UK in 2011-12, to a larger one in 2012-13. North Sea revenues declined further in 2013-14, making it likely that Scotland's relative fiscal position has continued to deteriorate.
Independence in 2016-17 would be very likely to take place against a backdrop of ongoing fiscal deficits. If the OBR's forecasts are correct, Scotland's deficit in that year would be larger than that of the UK. Analysis of the longer-run public finance pressures facing Scotland and the UK suggests that both would face considerable strain over the next 50 years as a result of the ageing population. But the public finance challenges facing an independent Scotland would appear to be more substantial than those facing the UK. This largely reflects the weaker initial position of Scotland's public finances and the likely long-run decline in revenues from oil and gas production, which will have a more significant effect on Scotland's fiscal position than that of the UK as a whole. This means that Scotland would likely need to implement further tax increases and/or spending cuts after 2016-17 to achieve a sustainable fiscal position, above and beyond those required by the UK. In other words, while independence would give Scotland more choices about how to manage its public finances, it would not allow Scotland to avoid the pain of further austerity.
Appendix 1. Reconciliation between GERS 2011---12 and GERS 2012---13
Revisions between GERS 2011-12 and 2012-13 revised down spending, on average, for most service areas (there are exceptions, however, such as public and common services and employment policies). The downwards revisions were largest in monetary terms for education and training and for social protection and in proportional terms for science and technology. These downwards revisions are more than offset by a large (about £900 million) upwards revision to the accounting adjustment, however, which means total spending in 2011-12 was revised up approximately £400 million. Between 2011-12 and 2012-13, the most notable falls in spending were for public and common services, defence, public order and safety, agriculture, forestry and fisheries and the accounting adjustment. The most notable increases were enterprise and economic development, environmental protection and social protection.
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UK up to 2018-19. In contrast, the Scottish government projections assume that total revenues grow at the same rate. Since the Scottish population is projected to grow less quickly than that of the rest of the UK over this period, this means that revenues per person grow more quickly in Scotland than in the UK under the Scottish government's methodology. It also means that its methodology produces higher projected revenue growth than our methodology. The difference between our June 2014 forecast for onshore revenues and the Scottish government's forecast from May 2014 is £500 million (or around 0.3% of Scottish GDP).
